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Abstract 
This chapter aims to assess the framework enabling private parties to enforce competition law and 
the implications this has both in relation to the evolution of national tort law in EU Member States, 
and for an incipient acquis of EU tort law. It considers how the law has evolved since the CJEU in 
Courage v Crehan confirmed that those able to show that they have suffered loss as a result of a 
competition law violation are able to recover compensatory damages, and the progress made since 
the adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages. The chapter focuses on four selected 
topics: the erosion of the requirement of fault; the erosion of individual responsibility; the extension 
of recoverable losses; and modifications to the burden of proof arising from a presumption of damage 
resulting from certain types of anticompetitive behaviour. It concludes by questioning whether 
traditional tort law doctrines at Member State level can survive under the pressure of these EU law 
developments. The chapter indicates areas of uncertainty that may serve to guide future research 
efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
When the Court of Justice ruled that the EU Treaties were not merely treaties in international law, 
enforceable only by their signatories, but created a sui generis legal order in which individuals can 
enforce EU Treaty obligations in the national courts, the rationale offered was that ‘[t]he vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the 
supervision entrusted by Articles [256 TFEU] and [257 TFEU] to the diligence of the Commission and 
of the Member States’.1 The system of dual vigilance means that EU competition law may be enforced 
not only by the European Commission and competent public authorities in the Member States, but 
also by private individuals through the national courts.2  
The task of enforcement has historically fallen on public authorities, in no small part due to the 
difficulties that private parties face in demonstrating substantive infringements of competition law 
without access to the significant investigative powers that public authorities hold. Extensive powers 
enabling public enforcement activities have been conferred on both the Commission and NCAs by 
both EU and national legislation.3 Whilst public enforcement was dominated initially by the European 
Commission, over time public enforcement has progressively been decentralised in favour of the 
Member States’ National Competition Authorities (NCAs),4 their activities being coordinated through 
the European Competition Network (ECN).5  
 
1 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, emphasis added. See also JHH Weiler, 
‘The transformation of Europe’ in The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” And Other 
Essays on European Integration (Cambridge, CUP, 1999) 20, and N Kroes, ‘More private antitrust enforcement 
through better access to damages: an invitation for an open debate’ SPEECH/06/158 (2006). 
2 BRT v SABAM, C-127/73, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16; Guérin automobiles v Commission, C-282/95 P, 
EU:C:1997:159, paragraphs 39-40; Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission, T-51/89, EU:T:1990:41, paragraph 42; 
Kühne & Heitz, C-453/00, EU:C:2004:17, paragraph 20; and Articles 1(1); 1(2); and 6 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
3 Mainly, by means of Regulation 1/2003 (n 2) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 
relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union], as repeatedly amended; consolidated version available at 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/773/2015-08-06 (last accessed 29 July 2016). Usually in domestic 
competition acts, which are complemented by general administrative and public law provisions. On the issues 
that the diversity of national approaches create, see Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing 
competition enforcement by the Member States' competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues, 
SWD(2014) 231/2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/swd_2014_231_en.pdf 
(last accessed 29 July 2016). 
4 K Cseres, ‘Comparing Laws in the Enforcement of EU and National Competition Laws’ (2010) 3(1) European 
Journal of Legal Studies 7. 
5 F Cengiz, ‘Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network’ (2010) 35(5) 
European Law Review 660. The coordination is not harmonisation and formally the EU and domestic public 
enforcement systems coexist. Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, C-14/68, EU:C:1969:4. The parallel 
existence of public enforcement regimes is emphasised in DHL Express (Italy) and DHL Global Forwarding (Italy), 
C-428/14, EU:C:2016:27. 
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Alongside the shift of enforcement from Commission to NCAs that is crystallised in Regulation 1/2003 
sits a desire for private parties to play their role in securing compliance with EU competition law 
obligations.6 The effort to encourage private parties to enforce EU competition law was catalysed by 
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Courage and Crehan,7 amplified by Manfredi,8 which makes 
clear that the possibility of claiming compensatory damages encourages compliance with the 
obligations that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU impose.9 Thus it is now well established that: 
‘the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in [Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU] would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim 
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict 
or distort competition’. 10  
It is clear that compensation for actual loss (damnum emergens) and loss of profit (lucrum cessans) 
must be available.11 By making it possible to recover compensatory damages private parties have an 
incentive to enforce competition law obligations adding to the public enforcement effort.  
Whilst private parties are interested in compensation, an accepted purpose of public enforcement is 
to deter infringements in general and so encourage compliance.12 What role do private parties play in 
the general deterrence aspect of competition law enforcement? Compensatory damages may create 
incentives to comply with competition law obligations by removing or reducing the benefits of non-
compliance. It would seem, at least in part, that private enforcement is also intended to promote this 
general deterrence.13 When private claimants seek to demonstrate an infringement of competition 
law that has not previously been demonstrated by a public enforcement decision,14 the purpose of 
the action is closer to the system of dual vigilance mentioned above, and the action may achieve both 
a deterrent and a compensatory effect. Conversely, when a private claimant merely seeks damages 
following-on from a prior public enforcement decision, the goal of the action is solely compensatory.15 
 
6 N Dunne, ‘Antitrust and the Making of European Tort Law’ (2016) 36(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 366-
399.  
7 Courage and Crehan, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465. 
8 Manfredi, C-295/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraphs 60 to 64. 
9 Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 39. 
10 Donau Chemie and Others, C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366, paragraph 21. 
11 Courage and Crehan, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 29; Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraphs 62, 95 and 100; and 
Dunne (n 6) 368. 
12 This can be seen from Articles 7 and 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
13 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 
101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 167/19, 13.6.2013), para.1 
14 In case of parallel private and public proceedings, Regulation 1/2003 sets out coordination mechanisms that 
exceed the purpose of our discussion. See also Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission 
and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles [101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union] [2004] OJ C 101/54. 
15 To date, most private enforcement actions have been of a follow-on nature. Whilst this is unlikely to change 
in the future, see J Drexl, ‘Consumer Actions after the Adoption of the EU Directive on Damage Claims for 
Competition Law Infringements’ (2015) Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 
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However, legal developments have grouped together the rules applicable to both stand-alone and 
follow-on actions, which creates some complications (as discussed throughout this chapter). It is 
argued that the promotion of general deterrence in competition law through national tort law regimes 
unduly distorts the latter. 
In order to flesh out the ways in which the use of tort to provide a remedy for those suffering from a 
competition law violation, and the specific requirements of Directive 2014/104/EU, put pressure on 
domestic tort law systems of the Member States, this chapter is structed as follows. It first describes 
how competition law infringements give rise to torts in national law (2), before turning to consider the 
erosion of the requirement of fault (3), the creation of special rules of causation (4), the erosion of the 
idea of individual responsibility (5), and the extension of recoverable losses (6). The final conclusions 
put these issues in the broader context of the discussion on the emergence of EU tort law (7).  
 
2. Competition infringements giving rise to a tort in national law 
Whilst public authorities have an express statutory framework setting out specific enforcement 
powers, no such framework exists for private individuals. Despite the adoption of Directive 
2014/104/EU on competition damages actions,16 the private enforcement of EU competition law 
remains dependent on the existence of national remedies and procedural rules, subject only to the 
general requirements of the EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence.17 As a result of infringing 
EU competition rules, an entity may find themselves to have invalidated a contract. Actions in the 
national court are often brought to determine the validity of, and if valid to enforce, the contract. This 
type of action has been common (if not always successful) due to the explicit provision on automatic 
 
15-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689521 (last accessed 1 August 2016). See however, Case 
1241/5/7/15 (T) Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v MasterCard Incorporated and Others [2016] CAT 11 and 
Socrates Training Limited v The Law Society of England and Wales: http://catribunal.org/237-9150/1249-5-7-16-
Socrates-Training-Limited.html  
16 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L 349/1. For discussion, see S Peyer, ‘The Antitrust Damages 
Directive – much ado about nothing?’, in M Marquis and R Cisotta (eds), Litigation and Arbitration in EU 
Competition Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 33; and P van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Embedding Procedural 
Autonomy: The Directive and National Procedural Rules’, in M Bergström, M Iacovides and M Strand (eds), 
Harmonising EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond, vol. 8 Swedish Studies in European Law 
(Oxford, Hart, 2016) 99 and ff. 
17 Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules (2004), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html (last accessed 29 June 2016). See B J 
Rodger, (ed) Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU, 
International Competition law Series no. 56 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2014). 
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contractual voidness in Article 101(2) TFEU.18 Private enforcement may also occur through tort-based 
claims before the national courts of the Member States.19 A remedy is available when (i) a competition 
law infringement is demonstrated; and (ii) the way that the competition law infringement occurs 
satisfies all the elements of a recognised tort in national law. When bringing an action for (ii) as a result 
of (i) the national court is bound by a number of rules and presumptions that EU law imposes and 
which consequently modify the national tort law system. The procedure and nature of the remedy 
otherwise remain subject to the: 
‘detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive directly from [Union] law, provided that such rules observe 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness’.20  
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice however increasingly seeks to prescribe procedural and 
substantive standards applicable to national tort-based mechanisms used to enforce obligations owed 
under EU competition law.21 This indirect means of remedy22—recovery through tort—suffers when 
the objective of allowing private parties to enforce competition law is not aligned with the general 
objectives pursued by the law of torts—ie when general deterrence of competition infringements is 
added to the standard sole or paramount tort goal of compensation for those that have suffered as a 
result of tort.23 This creates tension between domestic laws on torts and the demands placed on such 
 
18 See O Odudu ‘Competition Law and Contract’ in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU 
Law in Private Law Relationships, Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2013) 395-415. For discussion of private enforcement beyond compensatory damages see S Peyer, 
‘Compensation fallacy – private antitrust enforcement and the law of torts’, in J Galloway (ed), Intersections of 
Antitrust: Policy and Regulations (Oxford, OUP, forthcoming) and generally F Wilman, Private Enforcement of EU 
Law before National Courts (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 193 and ff. 
19 See Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board (1983) A.C. 130 (breach of statutory duty, Per Lord 
Diplock, 141, though see Lord Wilberforce at 151); Newson Holding Limited v IMI Plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1377 
(unlawful means conspiracy) and Air Canada & Ors v Emerald Supplies Limited & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 1024 
(unlawful interference with businesses by unlawful means and conspiracy to injure). Generally, see D Ashton 
and D Henry (eds), Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013); 
N B Gutta, The Enforcement of EU Competition Rules by Civil Law (Antwerpen, Maklu, 2014); and M Ioannidou, 
Consumer Involvement in Private EU Competition Law Enforcement (Oxford, OUP, 2015). 
20 Courage and Crehan, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 29; Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 54. 
21 See, for example, Pfleiderer, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389; Commission v EnBW, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112; Kone 
and Others, C-557/12, EU:C:2014:1317; AC-Treuhand v Commission, C-194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717; Schenker & Co. 
and Others, C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404. 
22 Or enforcement deficit, as discussed by M Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice. Issues of 
Harmonisation and Differentiation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) esp 386-387. 
23 Whether domestic tort law systems aim exclusively or only primarily to the provision of compensation is the 
object of increasing scholarly debate and an issue bound to raise in other contributions to this book. For the 
purpose of this contribution, our simplified position is that compensation is at least the prime or paramount goal 
of tort law systems and that their instrumentalisation to accommodate deterrence goals is problematic. 
Generally, on this issue, see J Steele, Tort Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, OUP, 3rd Ed., 2014) ch 1, the 
contributions by Geistfeld and by Cane to J Oberdiek, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford, 
OUP, 2014); or G Schwartz, ‘Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice’ 
(1997) 75 Texas Law Review 1801.  
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laws by those seeking to vindicate their competition law rights—often at the expense of the internal 
coherence of domestic systems of tort and rules of civil procedure. National systems are left with two 
options: either they contain the modifications required to torts when used to vindicate rights resulting 
from an infringement of EU competition law (or some category of economic torts arising as a result of 
an infringement of EU law)—or they revise the entirety of their tort law rules in order to accommodate 
these needs. While the first option creates division within the domestic tort and civil law system, the 
second option may present a risk of denaturalisation of tort law rules. Ultimately, though, it is possible 
neither options is available and that the domestic tort law systems of the Member States are pushed 
towards a dynamic of hybridisation. These are considerations to which we return in our conclusions.  
 
3. Eroding the fault requirement 
It is a common element of the tort law rules of most Member States that tort liability depends on a 
requirement of fault, and strict or no-fault liability is an exception.24 This is certainly the case in English 
law, where fault is generally required for liability in tort.25 By contrast, competition law infringements 
may occur without fault.26 Since fault is not required before a competition law infringement is 
established, but may be required to give rise to an actionable tort in national law, there is no remedy 
through tort for the competition law infringement and therefore no incentive to vindicate the right.  
The concern is expressed in the Commission’s 2005 Green paper on competition law damages actions, 
noting that the need to demonstrate fault may result in an insurmountable hurdle to recovery and 
sought to identify ways in which this barrier might be overcome.27 In its 2008 White paper on 
competition law damages actions the Commission made a number of proposals as to how national 
tort-based remedies could be recovered when an EU competition law violation was demonstrated.28 
The first proposal was to have an irrebuttable presumption of fault, as was already the position for 
some torts in some Member States.29 The second proposed measure was to require an EU competition 
law infringement to give rise to a presumption of fault under national law and for that presumption 
to be rebuttable only when it is demonstrated that a reasonable person applying a high standard of 
 
24 Ashurst (n 17), comparative report, 3. 
25 W V Horton Rogers, ‘Fault under English Law’, in P Widmer (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (The Hague, 
Kluwer, 2005) 65. 
26 See AC-Treuhand v Commission, EU:C:2015:717, paragraph 31, with reference to Dansk Rørindustri and Others 
v Commission, C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraphs 
142 and 143, showing a passive infringement. 
27 European Commission, Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 
final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52005DC0672 (last accessed 1 July 2016). 
28 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 
final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0165 (last accessed 1 July 2016). 
29 Ashurst (n 17), comparative report, 3. 
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care could not have been aware that the conduct restricted competition.30 This second proposal was 
not carried forward to the 2013 proposal for a Directive on competition damages claims, and the final 
version of Directive 2014/104/EU does not include any rules on fault requirements.31 
Whilst fault is not necessary to establish a substantive infringement of competition law, it is necessary 
in order to impose a fine. One approach to preserving the fault requirement in national law may be to 
presume fault only when this is established to the requisite level necessary to impose a fine. It might 
however be questioned whether the manner in which fault is established for the purpose of imposing 
a sanction would be sufficient to establish fault in a national tort-based claim. The weak sense in which 
fault is used for the purpose of competition law sanctions can be seen in Schenker, with the Court of 
Justice considering whether—having received legal advice that their conduct was lawful—the 
undertaking intentionally or negligently infringed the competition rules so that the imposition of a 
sanction was warranted.32 The Court of Justice considered that intention or negligence must be 
determined by considering whether the undertaking is aware, or could not have been unaware, of the 
effects that its conduct might have on competition and not by whether the undertaking is aware that 
its conduct infringes competition law.33 Legality relies on a difficult distinction between anti-
competitive effects and the consequences of normal competition, but expert advice does not 
exonerate the undertaking from sanctions when the wrong assessment is made. 
The Court of Justice has recognised that it is permissible for the national remedy for a breach of EU 
law to be predicated on a showing of fault.34 Its case law however has severely eroded the actual 
relevance of this requirement. Instead, because (a) a competition law infringement may arise without 
fault; and (b) a remedy must be made available; there is (c) pressure within national law to have a 
tort-based remedy that may be awarded without fault. This is achieved by presuming rather than 
demonstrating fault: 
 
30 Ibid, paragraph 2.4. Also K Stanton, ‘New Forms of the Tort of Breach of Statutory Duty’ (2004) 120 Law 
Quarterly Review 324 
31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.3, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF (last accessed 1 July 2016). 
32 Schenker & Co. and Others, EU:C:2013:404, paragraph 31. 
33 Schenker & Co. and Others, EU:C:2013:404, paragraph 37. 
34 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, SEC(2008) 404, [168]-[179], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/working_paper.pdf (last 
accessed 29 July 2016). 
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‘intention to injure the claimant need not be proved specifically in antitrust 
tort proceedings. Rather, it is indisputably presumed from the fact that the 
anticompetitive practice specifically harm the claimant’.35  
The system of objective liability used in substantive competition law seems to imply the same standard 
of objective liability for tort-based remedies. This presumption, if not the removal of fault stricto 
sensu, dramatically reduces the role of any fault requirement. An obligation to remedy arises 
independent of fault.36  
 
4. Causation 
The domestic tort law systems of the Member States rely on a requirement of causation in order to 
impose liability in tort. Causation requirements differ between Member States, and the Court of 
Justice has deferred to domestic rules concerning causation requirements in competition damages 
actions. As stressed in Manfredi, 
‘In the absence of [Union] rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic 
legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules …, including 
those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’, provided that 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed. 37 
The application of such domestic causation requirements can result in significant hurdles for the 
compensation of purely economic losses of a diffuse nature, such as those deriving from competition 
law infringements, due to unavoidable causal uncertainty.38 In order to overcome that difficulty, at 
least in part, Article 17(2) establishes a rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements cause harm. 
Cartels are defined in Article 2(14) of Directive 2014/104/EU as  
‘an agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors 
aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or 
influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices such as, 
but not limited to, the fixing or coordination of purchase or selling prices or 
other trading conditions, including in relation to intellectual property rights, 
the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets and 
 
35 C A Banfi, ‘Defining the Competition Torts as Intentional Wrongs’ (2011) 70(1) Cambridge Law Journal 83-112, 
84. 
36 F Pace, ‘The ECJ’s Judgment in Kone and Private Enforcement’s “Negative Harmonization Framework”: 
Another Brick in the Wall’ (2015) 2(1) Italian Antitrust Review 133-143. 
37 Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 64. 
38 I Lianos, ‘Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for Infringement of Competition Law in Europe’ (2015) 34(1) 
Yearbook of European Law 170; C Lombardi, Causation in private enforcement of competition law: a comparative 
analysis of divergent national approaches (2015) PhD thesis, University of Trento, available at http://eprints-
phd.biblio.unitn.it/1445/ (last accessed 3 August 2016).  
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customers, including bid-rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-
competitive actions against other competitors.’ 
Cartel conduct is that which is deemed most harmful and consequently universally condemned. Article 
17(2) removes the need to show that a cartel has caused harm, but this should not be necessarily 
constructed as a final legal determination that all cartels cause harm and economic theory has shown 
how there are instances in which cartels may actually not be harmful.39 Thus, the presumption in 
Article 17(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU is rebuttable. One way in which the presumption may be 
rebutted is by demonstrating that the conduct did not cause harm to the claimant because the 
claimant managed to pass that harm on down the distribution chain. The ability to make this claim 
however is constrained by Article 13 of Directive 2014/104/EU, which establishes that:  
‘the defendant in an action for damages can invoke as a defence … the fact 
that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting 
from the infringement of competition law. The burden of proving that the 
overcharge was passed on shall be on the defendant, who may reasonably 
require disclosure from the claimant or from third parties.’40 
Conversely, an indirect purchaser, relying on Article 14(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU, is deemed to 
have proven that harm has been passed on simply by showing (i) an infringement of competition law, 
thus triggering 17(2) in the case of a cartel violation of Article 101(1) TFEU; (ii) that the direct purchaser 
has suffered harm; and (iii) the indirect purchaser has purchased goods or services that were the 
object of competition law infringement, or has purchased goods or services derived from or containing 
them. It is then for the defendant to show that the harm was not, or was not entirely, passed on to 
the indirect purchaser. The combined effect of these evidentiary rules is that claimants benefit from 
a presumption of the existence of harm, and defendants are subjected to a demanding evidentiary 
burden to rebut the presumption. National procedural rules on reversal of the burden of proof and 
persuasion are excluded.41 This makes is advantageous to describe a number of claims as competition 
claims.42  
This system of presumptions aims to strengthen the financial incentive to sue (below 6) and to 
promote damages actions as an effective deterrence mechanism, but it also seems to create 
significant pressure towards the award of damages in situations where the existing evidence would 
not have been sufficient to support the claim but for the presumptions, or where it would have 
 
39 FP Maier-Rigaud, C Milde and M Helm, ‘Textbook Cartels versus the Real Deal: Should We Be Surprised if Some 
Cartels Do Not Lead to Damage?’ (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2578317 (last accessed 3 August 
2016). 
40 This is linked to the rules on disclosure of evidence in Directive 2014/104/EU (Arts 5 to 8). However, the detail 
of the disclosure system created by those provisions is not relevant for the purposes of our discussion. 
41 Dougan (n 22) 369-373. 
42 Below n 101. 
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sufficed to exonerate the defendant on the basis of a reversal of the burden of proof concerning the 
absence of economic harm on the claimant’s position. Ultimately, the system is open to a risk of over-
recovery in cases where the interplay of the presumptions allows for both the direct purchaser and 
the indirect purchaser to be compensated—that is, in cases involving the same facts, where the 
defendant is unable to demonstrate the existence of passing-on for the purposes of excluding its 
liability towards the direct purchaser (Art 13), but it is also unable to disprove it in order to exclude its 
liability towards the indirect purchaser (Art 14).43 This situation of potential over-recovery is only 
tackled incidentally through a requirement that Member States shall ensure that the national courts 
have the power to estimate, in accordance with national procedures, the share of any overcharge that 
was passed on [Art 12(5)], which is to be complemented by the future Commission’s guidelines on 
how to carry out that calculation (Art 16).44 This however seems insufficient to ensure absence of over-
recovery where procedures are initiated in ways that do not make all claims by direct and indirect 
buyers susceptible of an overall assessment. The issues of identification of harm, the ‘appropriability’ 
of diffuse economic losses through ‘crystallised’ or ‘packaged’ claims supported by an extraordinary 
and complex set of presumptions that stack the cards against competition infringers and the ensuing 
creation of a risk of excessive recovery, seem more than potentially problematic if such creation of 
special procedural and evidentiary rules is perceived as altering the fairness of the tort law system and 
potentially leading to excessive litigation on the basis of the modified evidentiary requirements. This 
can be justified in the case of stand-alone competition actions, where there are social gains derived 
from these private enforcement efforts, but it can be more difficult to justify in the case of follow-on 
actions where deterrence objectives had already been exhausted. This can also be particularly 
problematic if these special rules are extended to other areas of commercial or consumer litigation.  
Finally, in terms of evidentiary rules, it is also worth stressing that another of the aspects where the 
private enforcement of EU competition law can create significant pressures on traditional tort law 
mechanisms in the Member States concerns the quantification of damages.45 It is worth noting that 
Directive 2014/104/EU contains some specific rules on the quantification of damages. Firstly, Article 
 
43 However, the likelihood of such development can be doubted, see E Truli, ‘Will Its Provisions Serve Its Goals? 
Directive 2014/104/EU on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages for Competition Law Infringements’ 
(2016) 7(5) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 299, 309. 
44 This should have been completed in May 2016, but the Guidelines are not yet available at the time of writing 
the final version of this chapter. For further information, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ (last accessed 10 November 2016). 
45 See F P Maier-Rigaud and U Schwalbe, ‘Quantification of Antitrust Damages’, in D Ashton and D Henry (eds), 
Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013) 210; and G Niels 
and R Noble, ‘Quantifying Antitrust Damages – Economics and the Law’, in K Hüschelrath and H Schweitzer (eds), 
Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe, ZEW Economic Studies no 48 (Berlin, Springer, 
2014) 121. See also G Notaro, ‘Methods for Quantifying Antitrust Damages: The Pasta Cartel in Italy’ (2014) 10(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 87. 
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17(1) reiterates the general requirements of the principle of effectiveness, whereby ‘neither the 
burden nor the standard of proof required for the quantification of harm renders the exercise of the 
right to damages practically impossible or excessively difficult’. Putting this in connection with the right 
to full compensation enshrined in Article 3(1) of the Directive, it seems likely to contribute to the 
erosion of strict quantification rules in the Member States. Secondly, Article 17(1) also foresees the 
possibility for the domestic courts to ‘estimate the amount of harm if it is established that a claimant 
suffered harm but it is practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the harm 
suffered on the basis of the evidence available’. Coupled with the presumption of harm for cartel 
violations in Article 17(2) (above), this means that the courts of the Member States are under a de 
facto obligation to quantify damages in every cartel case that reaches their docket, even in the 
absence of precise evidence to support that calculation. Diverging interpretations of when ‘it is 
practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the harm’ could tend to perpetuate 
national differences in that regard, so it would not come as a surprise if this element of the ‘duty to 
quantify’ was litigated in front of the Court of Justice sooner rather than later. 
Given the difficulty of such a quantification exercise, the European Commission has adopted soft law 
to that effect, not only in the form of the Communication on quantifying harm,46 but also by means of 
a Practical Guide47 meant to offer assistance to both the national courts and to the parties involved in 
actions for damages by providing insights on the types of harm normally caused by anticompetitive 
practices and an overview of the main methods and techniques available to quantify such harm in 
practice. The existence of these instruments may serve to create convergence in methodological 
approaches to quantification of economic damage, which can then spill-over to other areas of 
commercial litigation such as intellectual property. Additionally, Article 17(3) of Directive 
2014/104/EU foresees that Member States shall ensure that, upon request of a national court, an NCA 
may assist the court with respect to the determination of the quantum of damages where that NCA 
considers such assistance to be appropriate.48 This may also have an impact on the way in which courts 
allow for amicus curiae interventions in tort law cases, which can also have spill-over effects in other 
 
46 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 
101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2013] OJ C 167/19. 
47 Practical Guide: Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD(2013) 205, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf (last accessed 7 July 
2016). 
48 For a discussion of how these soft law instruments and cooperation mechanisms are likely to affect domestic 
courts’ competence in this type of tort actions, see K Wright, ‘The Ambit of Judicial Competence after the EU 
Antitrust Damages Directive’ (2016) 43(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 15, 28-31. 
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areas of civil litigation, particularly where there is an administrative agency with competences or 
expertise broadly relevant to the resolution of the dispute. 
 
5. Erosion of the idea of individual responsibility 
EU competition law infringements are committed by undertakings. An undertaking has been defined 
as an economic unit.49 This economic unit is any entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the 
legal status of the entity engaged in that activity.50 However, a decision that the competition rules 
have been infringed must be addressed to one or more natural or legal persons in order that the 
decision may be enforced.51 Article 299 TFEU provides that acts of the Commission imposing 
‘pecuniary obligations on persons other than States’ are enforceable and governed by Member State’ 
rules of civil procedure, which are addressed to persons.52 The Commission has discretion as to which 
legal persons within the economic unit to address the decision.53 Under EU competition law the 
corporate legal person, its officers, and its employees comprise an economic entity vis-à-vis third 
parties and officers and employees may not themselves be the addressees of an infringement 
decision.54 It is neither necessary to demonstrate that the employer authorised or even knew of the 
infringement.55 Similarly, separate legal entities related by common ownership may also form the 
relevant economic unity and so be liable for a competition law infringement committed by any other 
legal entity within the grouping.56 The principles used to attribute liability for an infringement of EU 
 
49 Mo Och Domsjö AB v Commission , T-352/94, EU:T:1998:103, paragraph 87; General Química v Commission, 
C-90/09 P, EU:C:2011:21, paragraphs 34–36 and case-law cited. 
50 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21. See O Odudu, ‘The meaning of 
undertaking within 81 EC’ (2005) 7 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 211-241. 
51 Article 299(1) TFEU provides that decisions of (inter alia) the Commission that impose a pecuniary obligation 
on persons (other than States) shall be enforceable. On this point see Commission Decision (2003/2/EC) Vitamins 
[2003] OJ L 6/1, recital 637. 
52 The enforceability of decisions made against natural or legal persons is supported by the other language 
versions of Article 299 TFEU, eg ‘personnes’ in French; ‘persone’ in Italian, and ‘personas’ in Spanish. 
53 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission, Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, 
EU:C:1974:18, paragraph 41; BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission, T-65/89, EU:T:1993:31, 
paragraph 154; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, C-97/08 P, 
EU:C:2009:262, paragraph 36. 
54 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73, 
and 114/73, EU:C:1975:174, paragraph 539. This position is also adopted in the United Kingdom: Director 
General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd (Also known as Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2)) 
[1995] 1 AC 456. Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472, at paras. 19-23 per Longmore LJ and para. 
37 per Lloyd LJ. 
55 Slovenská sporiteľňa, C-68/12, EU:C:2013:71, paragraph 28 and Musique Diffusion Française v Commission, 
Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, at paragraph 97. 
56 Cascades v Commission, C-279/98 P, EU:C:2000:626, paragraph 78; Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v 
Commission, C-286/98 P, EU:C:2000:630, paragraph 37; KNP BT v Commission, C-248/98 P, EU:C:2000:625, 
paragraph 71; SCA Holding v Commission, C-297/98 P, EU:C:2000:633, paragraph 27. Advocate General Kokott 
has explained that ‘the concept of an undertaking and the imputation of responsibility under competition law 
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competition law have been described as ‘obscure and confused’ or at the very least seen as ‘a shadowy 
area’ in EU law.57  
Pushing to take this line of case law further, in a recent case, AG Wathelet proposed the creation of a 
presumption of (vicarious?) liability of companies for the behaviour of their appointed agents, which 
would make the principal liable for competition law infringements in which the agent participated.58 
In order to rebut the presumption and escape liability, the AG proposed that it would be incumbent 
upon the ‘client’ undertaking to adduce sufficiently convincing evidence (i) relating to the fact that the 
agent (services provider) had acted outside the scope of the functions that had been entrusted to it, 
(ii) regarding the precautionary measures taken by the ‘client’ undertaking at the time of designation 
of the agent and during the monitoring of the implementation of the functions in question, and (iii) 
regarding the ‘client’ undertaking’s conduct upon becoming aware of prohibited behaviour. Regarding 
the last condition, and in connection with Dansk Rørindustri (above 3), the ‘client’ undertaking would 
need to distance itself publicly from the forbidden act, prevent its repetition or report it to the 
administrative authorities. It is worth stressing that the CJEU has rejected this approach and stressed 
that,  
‘where a service provider offers, in return for payment, services on a given 
market on an independent basis, that provider must be regarded, for the 
purpose of applying rules aimed at penalising anti-competitive conduct, as a 
separate undertaking from those to which it provides services and the acts of 
such a provider cannot automatically be attributed to one of those 
undertakings’.59  
This does not exclude the possibility of establishing (vicarious) liability for the acts of the agent, but 
the Court has clarified that  
‘an undertaking may, in principle, be held liable for a concerted practice on 
account of the acts of an independent service provider supplying it with 
services only if one of the following conditions is met: the service provider 
was in fact acting under the direction or control of the undertaking 
concerned, or that undertaking was aware of the anti-competitive objectives 
pursued by its competitors and the service provider and intended to 
contribute to them by its own conduct, or that undertaking could reasonably 
 
are two sides of the same coin’, in Commission v Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, C-440/11 P, 
EU:C:2013:514, paragraph 32. 
57 J Briggs and S Jordan ‘Presumed Guilty: Shareholder Liability for a Subsidiary’s Infringements of Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty’ (2007) 8 Business Law International 1. See also WPJ Wils, ‘The Undertaking as Subject of EC 
Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons’ (2000) 25 European Law 
Review, 99-116, 101-102. See the call for clarification of in European Parliament Resolution of 9 March 2010 on 
the Report on Competition Policy 2008 (2009/2173(INI)), para. 50. 
58 Opinion of AG Wathelet in VM Remonts and Others, C-542/14, EU:C:2015:797. 
59 VM Remonts and Others, C-542/14, EU:C:2016:578, paragraph 25. 
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have foreseen the anti-competitive acts of its competitors and the service 
provider and was prepared to accept the risk which they entailed’.60  
These conditions, and in particular the last one, may still create some uncertainty. However, they seem 
aligned with the CJEU’s case law on the irrelevance of fault for the purposes of the sanctioning of 
infringements of competition law, for which it suffices to prove that the undertaking could not have 
been unaware of the anticompetitive risks of a given (type of) market behaviour (see above 3). 
Moving to the arena of damages actions, does the fact that a person is addressed by a finding of 
infringement mean that that person is responsible for any tort that the EU competition law 
infringement may reveal? Under national tort rules it would seem necessary to determine whether 
the conduct of the officers and employees can be attributed to the employer so that the employer can 
be held vicariously liable. Similarly, the separate legal status of the various legal entities within a single 
economic entity would imply limited liability.61 Similarly, an undertaking may be liable for an 
infringement if it aids another, but would and should that undertaking be liable also in tort?62 
Beyond responsibility extended by ignoring the distinction between legal persons, an undertaking is 
also to be held jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by all other infringing entities. This was 
provided for explicitly in the Commission’s 2013 proposal for the new Directive on damages claims 
solely on the basis that: 
‘[w]here several undertakings infringe the competition rules jointly — 
typically in the case of a cartel — it is appropriate that they be jointly and 
severally liable for the entire harm caused by the infringement’.63  
This was considered by the Commission to be a justifiable reform proposal on the basis that: 
‘[d]epending on the existing legal framework in the Member States, the 
introduction of joint and several liability for co-infringers will entail low or no 
transposition costs’.64  
 
60 Ibid, paragraph 33, emphasis added. 
61 See e.g. Davies, Gower, Worthington, and Micheler, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed., 2012), at 33-40 and Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, 48/69, EU:C:1972:70, 
column 632, before noting the German, French, and Belgian law makes parents jointly and severally liable for 
conduct engaged in by subsidiaries. See also Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 per Sumption at para. 
16. 
62 AC-Treuhand v Commission, EU:C:2015:717, paragraphs 38 and 39 and C C Talbot, ‘AC-Treuhand, the Scope of 
Article 101 TFEU, and the Future of Actions for Antitrust Damages’ (2016) 23(1) Commercial Law Practitioner 9-
14. 
63 Above (n 31), explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.3.3. 
64 European Commission, Impact Assessment Report on the proposed Directive on damages actions for breach 
of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203 final, 64, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf (last accessed 1 July 
2016). 
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However, beyond the issue of the calculation of transposition costs, for which no authority or 
explanation is offered, it would seem necessary to assess the impact this could have in terms of the 
general rules on joint liability in the Member States.65 It is possible that joint and several liability for 
tort or non-contractual damages is already the default rule in most Member States. However, if this is 
not the case, or the interpretation of which undertakings ‘jointly infringe’ competition law is 
excessively broad (see below in this same section), there is a risk of unnecessary expansion of passive 
standing rules that may drag innocent undertakings into costly litigation, even if they end up limiting 
or excluding any obligation to compensate for damages or can recover them from guilty co-
defendants. As we will see below, this is a major issue for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which 
may face disproportionate bankruptcy risks as a result of such alteration of standing rules as an implicit 
effect of the expansion of joint and several liability. 
In the adopted version of Directive 2014/104/EU, Article 11(1) contains a rule whereby: 
‘undertakings which have infringed competition law through joint behaviour 
are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement of 
competition law; with the effect that each of those undertakings is bound to 
compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party has the right to require 
full compensation from any of them until he has been fully compensated’.  
This can be problematic because it seems to exclude any domestic rules that, in case of joint liability 
resulting in recovery judgments against a multiplicity of debtors, could still allow for an apportioning 
of liability between the joint infringers, as well as domestic rules on excussion benefits that could 
require exhausting the possibilities of claiming reimbursement from each and all joint tortfeasors 
before seeking recovery from a given tortfeasor beyond its share of the damages caused. The 
complication can also derive from the interplay between these rules and bankruptcy law, where 
reduced payments in the context of the liquidation of one of the tortfeasors may have unclear effects 
on the value of any residual claims against the rest of them.  
These issues of potential distortion of general mechanisms of apportionment of the payments or 
reimbursements derived from joint infringements of competition law (broadly understood) can be 
seen in the need for an additional rule in Article 19 of Directive 2014/104/EU to deal with the effects 
of consensual settlements on subsequent actions for damages. According to this complex rule, in 
principle, consensual settlements between a claimant and a joint tortfeasor can be limited to the 
latter’s share of the damages caused, in which case the claim of the settling injured party is reduced 
by the settling co-infringer's share of the harm that the infringement of competition law inflicted upon 
 
65 Indeed, joint and several liability rules and several-only liability rules diverge in terms of their enforcement 
costs; see L A Kornhauser, ‘Economic analysis of joint and several liability’, in J Arlen (ed), Research Handbook 
on the Economics of Torts (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013) 199 and ff. 
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the injured party (even if the settlement has been for a lower amount, as should be expected). This is 
coupled with two additional rules, whereby the settling co-infringer cannot be the object of any 
additional claims and non-settling co-infringers shall not be permitted to recover contribution for the 
remaining claim from the settling co-infringer. However, where the non-settling co-infringers cannot 
pay the damages that correspond to the remaining claim of the settling injured party, the settling 
injured party may exercise the remaining claim against the settling co-infringer. Ultimately, then, a 
combined reading of the rules in Article 11(1) and 19(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU can have significant 
effects beyond tort law and into contract law in the Member States, particularly through the creation 
of a weak form of reviewability of the terms of the settlement agreement in case of (subsequent) 
inability to pay by joint tortfeasors—or, at the very least, a very expansive interpretation of implicit 
rebus sic stantibus clauses. 
Furthermore, and in order to try to alleviate the draconian effects it could have on undertakings with 
lesser financial muscle amongst the pool of co-defendants in competition damages claims, the rule of 
(absolute) joint and several liability of all undertakings that ‘infringed competition law through joint 
behaviour’ [Art 11(1)] is coupled with exceptions for SMEs66 [Art 11(2) and (3)], and for undertakings 
that have benefitted from immunity from fines under the relevant leniency programmes [Art 11(4)].67 
According to the first of these exceptions, SMEs are liable only to their own direct and indirect 
purchasers where (a) their market share in the relevant market was below 5% at any time during the 
infringement of competition law; and (b) the application of the normal rules of joint and several 
liability would irretrievably jeopardise their economic viability and cause their assets to lose all their 
value. But this exception does not apply where: (a) the SME has led the infringement of competition 
law or has coerced other undertakings to participate therein; or (b) the SME has previously been found 
to have infringed competition law.  
According to the second exception, undertakings that have benefitted from immunity of the fines are 
to be made jointly and severally liable as follows: (a) to its direct or indirect purchasers or providers; 
and (b) to other injured parties only where full compensation cannot be obtained from the other 
undertakings that were involved in the same infringement of competition law (i.e. they enjoy an 
excussion right). Therefore, immunity recipients are given conditional exemption from joint and 
several liability, which will only be lifted in case their joint tortfeasors are unable to meet their financial 
 
66 As defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises [2003] OJ L 124/36. 
67 See the various documents that regulate the European Commission’s leniency programme, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/leniency_legislation.html (last accessed 1 August 2016). 
Each NCA has its own leniency programme, for which there is an ECN model, and the CJEU has ruled that they 
all operate independently; DHL Express (Italy) and DHL Global Forwarding (Italy), EU:C:2016:27. 
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obligations. Far from being a situation that can be considered exceptional, it seems clear that Directive 
2014/104/EU intends to establish this conditional exemption in narrow terms, particularly by requiring 
that Member States ensure that any limitation period applicable to these cases is reasonable and 
sufficient to allow injured parties to bring such actions (which should be determined in view of the 
eventual existence of bankruptcy proceedings for some or all of the codefendants).  
Finally, it is also worth noting that the general rule of Article 11(1) is coupled with additional rules on 
recovery amongst the jointly liable infringers [Art 11(5) and (6)]. As the general rule for 
reimbursement, the Directive establishes that an infringer may recover a contribution from any other 
infringer, the amount of which shall be determined in the light of their relative responsibility for the 
harm caused by the infringement of competition law. However, the amount of contribution of an 
infringer which has been granted immunity from fines under a leniency programme shall not exceed 
the amount of the harm it caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or providers (which 
strengthens the partial exemption from joint several liability discussed above). Moreover, to the 
extent the infringement of competition law caused harm to injured parties other than the direct or 
indirect purchasers or providers of the infringers, the amount of any contribution from an immunity 
recipient to other infringers shall be determined in the light of its relative responsibility for that harm. 
This comes to establish special rules on reimbursement between jointly and severally liable 
codefendants in damages claims that are also bound to deviate significantly from the general rules 
applicable under the tort law systems of the Member States. 
Overall, this set of rules on joint and several liability includes redistributive policy considerations, such 
as partial protection of SMEs from the risks of bankruptcy that can derive from having joint liability 
with potentially much larger co-infringers, as well as broader enforcement policy goals, such as the 
minimisation of the liability in damages to which leniency applicants are exposed. The intertwining of 
all these goals is bound to create problems of transposition in many Member States. 
Beyond these issues of alteration of the general rules potentially applicable to claims of joint and 
several liability under the domestic rules of the Member States, and strictly from the perspective of 
the main rule of (absolute) joint and several liability in Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU, it is 
worth emphasising that significant uncertainty arises from the main criterion used to determine which 
undertakings are deemed to be jointly and severally liable because the ‘circle of relevant tortfeasors’ 
for these purposes is determined by the fact that they ‘infringed competition law through joint 
behaviour’. Interestingly enough, such concept of ‘joint behaviour’ is not defined in Directive 
2014/104/EU and it does not easily match the scope of the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, which 
refers to the different terms of agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
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undertakings and concerted practices. Recital (37) of Directive 2014/104/EU not very helpfully 
indicates that: 
‘[w]here several undertakings infringe the competition rules jointly, as in the 
case of a cartel, it is appropriate to make provision for those co-infringers to 
be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm caused by the 
infringement’.  
In view of the cases discussed above, in a setting where the Court of Justice expands the circle of 
(co)infringers beyond the undertakings directly and actively engaged in the collusive practices to also 
include (i) those economic operators that remain passive and fail to oppose the collusion,68 (ii) to those 
that advise the ‘primary’ infringers,69 or (iii) (potentially) to those that are represented by the ‘primary’ 
infringers if there is a certain assumption of risk of anticompetitive effects,70 this criterion of ‘joint 
behaviour’ is bound to require significant clarification by the Court of Justice and no smaller 
interpretive efforts by the domestic courts of the Member States, particularly those less used to 
similar mechanisms of joint or extended liability. It can also be problematic in cases where it is 
controversial whether the infringement of competition law is unilateral, or at least significantly 
asymmetric, despite involving a plurality of undertakings,71 and in cases where different defendants 
participated in different levels of intensity or during different periods of time in long-lasting continued 
infringements.  
All of this can create tensions at the point where the EU rule needs to be coordinated with pre-existing 
doctrines of joint and several liability at Member State level, especially where the mechanism of joint 
liability is conceptualised as being limited to defendants substantially in the same position, or having 
contributed in an equivalent manner to the causation of the damage. It can also be perceived as 
pushing the conceptualisation of tortfeasor beyond its natural remit and including economic agents 
that have only very indirectly contributed to the generation of the damage suffered by the claimant, 
which may trigger difficulties in terms of requirements of proximity between tortfeasor and victim. 
Overall, the emergence of the rule on joint and several liability seems riddled with complexities, which 
make it difficult to assess its boundaries. 
 
6. Recoverable Loss 
 
68 Dansk Rørindustri and Others, EU:C:2005:408. 
69 AC-Treuhand v Commission, EU:C:2015:717. 
70 VM Remonts and Others, EU:C:2016:578. 
71 See GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, C-501/06 P, EU:C:2009:610. 
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Not only has the Court sought to expand the number of legal entities the behaviour for which the 
undertaking can be held responsible, it has also sought to expand the type of loss for which the 
undertaking can be held responsible.72 The need to expand the type of loss for which an undertaking 
is to be held responsible arises due to the diffuse nature of harm from anti-competitive conduct.73 
Competition infringements not only have economic impact on those that are contractually related or 
operate within the market in which the infringement occurs, but extend to impact those that do not 
have a contractual relationship and those not trading on that same market.74 There is harm to those 
that would make certain consumption decisions in a competitive market but make different decisions 
in the distorted market (deadweight losses), loss of quality, loss of variety, reduced innovation, all of 
which are more difficult to appraise than traditional losses recognised in tort.75  
The Commission, initially at least, has been reluctant to prescribe the types of loss that may be 
recoverable in tort in order to provide a remedy for breach of EU competition law.76 National torts 
established when competition law is infringed have provided for compensatory damages.77 Claimants 
however have found it difficult to establish that they have suffered loss, particularly due to the 
complexities of establishing that the loss suffered has not been passed on further down the value 
chain when the infringement takes place on a market for intermediate goods78 (though see now the 
presumption of damage, above 4). Owing to the difficulties faced when seeking to prove loss claimants 
have sought inter alia user damages (damages assessed by reference to the fair price for what has 
been taken from the claimant); exemplary damages (damages additional to an award which fully 
compensates the claimant for his loss, and which are intended to punish and deter); and restitutionary 
awards (an award of money assessed by reference to the wrongdoer’s gain rather than by reference 
to the victim’s loss). National courts have not proven receptive to the idea that these alternative 
 
72 Along the same lines, see N Dunne, ‘“Umbrella Effects” and Private Antitrust Enforcement’ (2014) 73(3) 
Cambridge Law Journal 510, and ibid, ‘It never rains but it pours? Liability for “umbrella effects” under EU 
competition law in Kone’ (2014) 51(6) Common Market Law Review 1813. 
73 F Marcos and A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules: Harmonising Tort Law through the Back Door?’ (2008) 16(3) European Review Private Law 469, 
475. 
74 T Eger and P Weise, ‘Are Consumers Really the Main Victims of Price Cartels?’ (2015) 32 (3/4) Homo 
Oeconomicus 375. 
75 Above (n 46) and (n 47). 
76 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules (n 34) [194]. 
77 In England, see Devenish Nutrition Ltd & Ors v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch), at 
para. [19] – [22], [50]. Regarding the Spanish seminal case of the sugar cartel, see F Marcos, ‘Damages claims in 
the Spanish sugar cartel’ (2015) 3(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 205-225. 
78 M Strand, ‘Indirect Purchasers, Passing-on and the New Directive on Competition Law Damages’ (2014) 10(2) 
European Competition Journal 361-386; M Siragusa, ‘Private Damages Claims – Recent Developments in the 
Passing-On Defence’, in  K Hüschelrath & H Schweitzer (eds), Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law 
in Europe, Vol. 48 ZEW Economic Studies (Berlin, Springer, 2014) 229-246. 
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means of remedying the tort are to be made more generally available when the tort is founded on a 
competition law infringement than when the tort is otherwise established. Ultimately, expanding the 
rules applicable when a claim in tort is founded on a breach of competition law threatens the unity of 
tort law and, more generally, civil law in a given jurisdiction.79 More specifically, reasons for reticence 
have been that compensatory damages provide a sufficient remedy or alternative remedies will leave 
the claimant unjustly enriched.80 Specifically, access to restitutionary awards has been guarded, it 
being noted: 
‘that whatever the law ought to be, it is not (yet) the law that a restitutionary 
award is available in all cases of tort. In my judgment a restitutionary award 
is not an available remedy in an anti-trust case. If the law is to be changed, it 
must be done by a higher court than this one. Moreover, even where a 
restitutionary award is available, it is generally awarded where an award of 
more traditionally based compensatory damages would be inadequate to 
compensate the claimant for the invasion of his rights.’81 
The reluctance to award anything other than compensatory damages is driven by a perception that 
the function of tort law is to provide compensation.82 Thus, when an action in tort is used to provide 
a remedy for an infringement of EU competition law it would seem natural—given the paramount 
function of tort—that the remedies available will be based on the compensation principle.83 This is 
consistent with the task of public action being to deter competition law infringements.84 It is also 
consistent with the idea that private action adds nothing to the deterrence of conduct when public 
 
79 M Hellwig, ‘Private damages claims and the passing on defence in horizontal price-fixing cases—An 
economist’s perspective’, in J Basedow (ed), Private enforcement of EC competition law (The Hague, Kluwer, 
2007) 121, 122. 
80 Devenish Nutrition (n 77) at para. [24]-[32], [105] and [110]-[117] and Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraphs 
87 and 94. 
81 Devenish Nutrition (n 77)  at para. [108] 
82 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA [2008] EWCA Civ 1086, para. 43-45 ; Simon F Deakin, Angus C 
Johnston and B S Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (7th, Oxford Oxford University Press, 2013) 45; 
and G Williams, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ (1951) 4 Current Legal Problems 137-176. 
83 Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraphs 85 and 86, and AG Opinion, EU:C:2006:67, paragraphs 68-70, and P 
Nebbia, ‘Damages Actions for the Infringement of EC Competition Law: Compensation or Deterrence?’, (2008) 
33 European Law Review 23-43. CF Weidt, ‘The Directive on Actions for Antitrust Damages After Passing the 
European Parliament’ (2014) 35 European Competition Law Review 438–444; M Kuijpers and others, ‘Actions for 
Damages in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany’ (2015) 6 Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 129-142; FP Maier-Rigaud, ‘Toward a European Directive on Damages Actions’ (2014) 10 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 341-360; R van den Bergh and S Keske, ‘Private Enforcement of European 
Competition Law: Quo Vadis?’ (2007) 3 European Review of Contract Law 468-486. For a US perspective see H 
First, ‘Lost in Conversation: The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law’ (2010) SSRN eLibrary. For a wider 
understanding see C Cauffman, ‘Injunctions at the Request of Third Parties in EU Competition Law’ (2010) 17 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 58–86; S Peyer, ‘Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany 
from 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence’ (2012) 8 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 331–359; K Yeung, 
‘Privatizing Competition Regulation’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 581–616. 
84 AG Opinion in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:67, paragraph 64.  Devenish Nutrition (n 77) at para. 40-55 and 115). 
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enforcement action has been taken against that same conduct and the same parties (see 1 above).85 
While public enforcement is meant to prevent the harm in the functioning of the (internal) market 
that derives from anticompetitive behaviour by imposing fines to deter, there is a view that the role 
of private actions is solely ‘ to repair the harm suffered because of an infringement’, which means the 
remedies available are inherently limited to ‘a right to compensation’.86 The claim therefore is that the 
principal role to be played by private claimants ‘is corrective justice and compensation and not just 
deterrence’.87 Yet the purpose of dual vigilance—enabling private parties as well as public authorities 
to enforce EU competition law is not simply to enable compensation to be awarded but to deter 
infringement and thus secure compliance with EU competition law obligations. Dual vigilance is 
intended to increase the number of enforcers and the resources devoted to enforcement, so 
immunising the enforcement (and thus compliance) from the prevailing political support or 
constraints on public finances.88 
There has been a long running desire for private parties to vigorously enforce the rights conferred on 
them by EU competition law and thus contribute to deterring infringements/encouraging 
compliance.89 In the case of stand-alone private enforcement actions, there are social benefits of this 
(additional) competition law enforcement (everyone benefits from a competitive market place) but 
the party bringing action shoulders the risk and costs of private enforcement.90 How is the conflict 
between a policy designed to increase compliance through deterrence—private enforcement—and 
the idea that the remedies available for those enforcing through national tort law are able only to 
receive compensation to be resolved? Formally at least the Court of Justice recognizes that it is a 
matter for national law and policy to determine whether objectives other than compensation can be 
pursued in the national remedial system.91 There have however been attempts to increase the 
incentives for those bringing a private enforcement action and this will necessarily affect the 
conception of who is entitled to a remedy and what that remedy should entail.92 The Commission 
 
85 Devenish Nutrition (n 77)  at para. [56]-[64]. 
86 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm (n 46). 
87 Lianos (n 38) 176. See also WPJ Wils, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private 
Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32(1) World Competition 3-26. 
88 H J Banks & Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation (Case C-128/92) [1994] ECR I-1209, at para 43, Advocate General’s 
Opinion and AP Komninos, ‘New prospects for private enforcement of EC competition law: Courage v Crehan 
and the Community right to damages’ [2002] 39 CML Rev 447, at p 458.  
89 This is one focus of the enquiry conducted by Clifford A Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the Eu, 
Uk and USA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) xliii, 263. 
90 Commission Staff Working Paper – Annex to the Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules, COM(2005) 672, 19 December 2005, at paras. 38, 52, 192. Blue Shield v McCready 457 US 465, 472 (1982). 
91 Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraphs 91 and 98. 
92 One reason for allowing a claimant to retain any loss that is subsequently passed on is that to make a deduction 
would reduce the incentive of the party to bring an action: European Commission (2005), Commission Staff 
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makes this clear, writing: 
‘In designing any system for claiming antitrust damages the main objective 
must be the efficient and effective enforcement of the antitrust rules. Such a 
system would ideally be able to accommodate both the deterrence and the 
compensation aims to some degree. … Given the above-mentioned 
complexities, it is, however, likely that a trade-off between justice (in the 
sense of full recovery for all those who have suffered a loss from an illegal 
practice) and efficiency is inevitable.    
It is suggested that the determining factor could be the effective enforcement 
of [Union] law. If limiting the rights of certain individuals to claim is necessary 
to ensure a system which is more effective in safeguarding the enforcement 
of Articles [101 and 102], then it is submitted that such limitations should be 
acceptable under [Union] law.’93 
Following the national approach as to what may be recovered through tort may not provide a 
sufficiently great incentive for private parties to take the risk involved in privately enforcing EU 
competition law.94 The Court’s increasing emphasis on effectiveness makes it probable that what is 
had in mind is an effective incentive for private parties to enforce EU competition law.95 Kone provides 
an example of the expanded nature of the harm for which the tortfeasor is seen as responsible and 
for which a claimant can recover where the market mechanism is distorted due to the existence of a 
cartel. Some do not purchase from cartel members, yet the price charged by non- cartel members is 
higher owing to the existence of the cartel. This overcharge can be recovered from cartel members 
despite the fact that the relevant transaction takes place at arm’s length of the colluding infringers.96 
Whether that claim was possible under the relevant Austrian tort rules was at issue, particularly 
because they established that: 
‘[a]ny person shall be entitled to seek compensation for injury caused by 
another person who caused that injury through his fault, whether the injury 
was caused by breach of a contractual obligation or was unrelated to a 
contract’.97  
The analysis followed by the Court of Justice in this case was objective and abstract, and relied on the 
mechanics of market mechanisms. According to the Court:  
[the] market price is one of the main factors taken into consideration by an 
undertaking when it determines the price at which it will offer its goods or 
 
Working Paper – Annex to the Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 
672, 19 December 2005, at para 38. 
93 Annex to the Green Paper (n 92) at paras 179-180. 
94 Ibid, at para 38. 
95 Ibid, at paras 40, 121.  
96 Kone and Others, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 29. 
97 Article 1295 of the Austrian General Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) as translated in Kone 
and Others, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 3. 
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services. Where a cartel manages to maintain artificially high prices for 
particular goods and certain conditions are met, relating, in particular, to the 
nature of the goods or to the size of the market covered by that cartel, it 
cannot be ruled out that a competing undertaking, outside the cartel in 
question, might choose to set the price of its offer at an amount higher than 
it would have chosen under normal conditions of competition, that is, in the 
absence of that cartel. In such a situation, even if the determination of an 
offer price is regarded as a purely autonomous decision, taken by the 
undertaking not party to a cartel, it must none the less be stated that such a 
decision has been able to be taken by reference to a market price distorted 
by that cartel and, as a result, contrary to the competition rules.98 
The Court concludes that: 
‘a loss being suffered by the customer of an undertaking not party to a cartel 
… because of an offer price higher than it would have been but for the 
existence of that cartel is one of the possible effects of the cartel, that the 
members thereof cannot disregard’.99  
Thus, the question is whether the ability to recover any loss personally suffered is sufficient incentive 
to encourage a private party to bring an action that will deter undertakings from causing harm so 
widely disseminated that no particular claimant suffers a cognisable loss worthy of bringing suit—
which can be alleviated in the case of effective class action or collective redress mechanisms that aim 
to aggregate the economic value of the (class) claim so as to make litigation viable or desirable.100 In 
any case, the better question is whether the nature of such harm is inherently unsuited to recovery 
by private individuals and must be left to public enforcers to deter. Is tort law an appropriate 
mechanism to remedy, ex post, all distortions in the functioning of the market mechanism, or is this 
primarily a matter for public enforcement to resolve? Or will domestic tort systems expand to 
compensate for the diffuse effects of all distorted market situations, which can be particularly 
sensitive in areas concerning financial markets or consumer products?101  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the creation of such incentives for private enforcement 
through damages actions can also be self-defeating for the ultimate goal of ensuring the efficient and 
 
98 Kone and Others, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 29. 
99 Kone and Others, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 30. 
100 See Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law 
[2013] OJ L 201/60. For discussion, see D Geradin, ‘Collective Redress for Antitrust Damages in the European 
Union: Is This a Reality Now?’ (2015) 22(5) George Mason Law Review 1079-1101. For critical assessment, in 
relation to the US, see RH Lande, ‘Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions are Essential for Compensation and 
Deterrence’ (2016) 30(2) Antitrust 81-85. 
101 This issue is likely to become particularly prominent in relation with the LIBOR manipulation cases. For 
discussion of the adequacy of competition law mechanisms to tackle this type of damage to the working of the 
market mechanism in regulated financial industries, see AK Pascall, ‘Tail Wagging the Dog: The Manipulation of 
Benchmark Rates – A Competitive Bone of Contention’ (2016) 39(2) World Competition 161-190. 
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effective (public) enforcement of the competition rules, particularly where the facilitation of private 
claims would increase the risk of liability of competition law infringers, which can in turn be 
discouraged from resorting to other mechanisms considered highly enhancing of competition law 
enforcement, such as leniency programmes and settlement options.102 In this case, the Commission 
has also expressed a clear preference towards ensuring the effectiveness of (public) competition law 
enforcement, but in this case by means of excluding certain procedural rules concerning access to the 
public file and discovery, so as to insulate to the maximum possible extent leniency applicants from 
liability.103 The same rationale has been used to justify the creation of asymmetrical joint and several 
liability rules (see above 5). Ultimately, then, it seems that the promotion of the efficient and effective 
enforcement of EU competition law requires a very complex alteration of the domestic rules on 
entitlement to remedies and recoverable losses, sometimes in a contradictory manner, so as to 
accommodate diverging aspects of that same ultimate goal. The extent to which this is feasible in a 
way that result in foreseeable rules can be doubted. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how the case law of the Court of Justice on the private enforcement of 
competition law and the specific rules of Directive 2014/104/EU that aim to boost its effectiveness 
have a significant impact on the tort law systems of the Member States. Rather than autonomous 
systems, a body of EU principles applicable to national tort law begins to emerge. The chapter has 
focused on selected issues to shed some light on areas of particular pressure for change or adaptation 
of domestic systems. It has aimed to stress that the instrumental use of tort law rules for the purposes 
of increasing the effectiveness of EU competition law through the dual vigilance mechanism creates 
pressure on domestic systems by trying to accommodate deterrence goals where compensation was 
the sole (or paramount) concern. 
 
102 Above n 67. C Canenbley and T Steinvorth, ‘Effective Enforcement of Competition Law: Is There a Solution to 
the Conflict between Leniency Programmes and Private Damages Actions?’ (2011) 2(4) Journal of European 
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Damages’ (2011) 7(2) Competition Law Review 181-220; and B Nascimbene, ‘Interaction between Leniency 
Programmes and Damages Actions in Antitrust Law: Perspectives for Collective Redress’ (2013) 36(2) World 
Competition 269-283. 
103 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1348 of 3 August 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 relating to 
the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union] [2015] L 208/3. See also Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European 
Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012 concerning the protection of leniency material in the context of civil 
damages actions, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf (last 
accessed 31 July 2016). 
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The erosion of traditional requirements of tort law or non-contractual responsibility systems, such as 
the requirement of fault (above 3) or the idea of responsibility (above 5), indicate a move towards 
(quasi)strict civil liability for infringements of competition law. Such (quasi)strict civil liability system is 
then modified to incorporate policy and redistributive concerns respectively related to the 
development of leniency programmes and an SME-friendly regulatory environment.  
On their part, the creation of special rules on recoverable losses (above 6), and the modifications of 
the burden of proof via a presumption of harm for cartel offences and rather flexible quantification 
techniques (above 4), create significant financial incentives for private plaintiffs to engage in damages 
litigation against competition violators. By recognising diffused economic damage as susceptible of 
compensation, the developments in the area of private enforcement of EU competition law have 
tended to isolate, ‘crystallise’, ‘package’ and make appropriable damages claims that would otherwise 
probably be considered too diffuse and indirect as to grant specific rights to compensation. This is 
likely to result in an imbalance, at least as compared with traditional tort law rules. While these 
changes can be justified for stand-alone enforcement actions that create additional social benefits 
through deterrence, their availability for follow-on actions that only seek compensation is difficult to 
justify. Given that most private damages actions for breaches of EU competition law follow on 
previous public enforcement interventions, overall, the desirability of these legal developments is 
open to question. 
Overall, the discussion supports the view that the development of mechanisms for the private 
enforcement of EU competition rules is bound to have a significant impact on the domestic tort law 
rules of the Member States, which could only be minimised if they decided to create special 
mechanisms for competition law damages actions and not extend them to other types of tort 
litigation. However, in the long run, it seems unlikely that such separation can be kept watertight and 
a certain degree of spill-over to other areas of commercial litigation can be expected. This is not 
necessarily a positive development at domestic level and does not ensure the emergence or 
consolidation of efficient rules of EU tort law. However, that assessment is better saved for another 
occasion. 
